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CHANGES IN THE RECRUITMENT PATTERNS OF THE 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ELITES IN SERBIA1 
Promene regrutacijskih obrazaca ekonomske i političke elite u Srbiji 
APSTRAKT U tekstu se analizira promena regrutacijskih obrazaca ekonomske i političke elite u Srbiji 
na osnovu podataka prikupljenih u našim anketnim istraživanjima u 1989, 1993. i 2004. godini. Naša 
hipoteza je da su se obrasci regrutacije elita promenili nakon promene političkog režima u 2000. 
godini, ali u drugačijem pravcu nego tokom 1990-ih. Iz dugoročne perspektive, očekujemo dalji porast 
značaja visokog obrazovanja za regrutaciju elita i izjednačavanje njegovog značaja za regrutaciju 
političke i ekonomske elite. S druge strane, očekujemo opadanje značaja pripadnosti vladajućim 
političkim partijama kod ekonomske elite, zajedno sa rastućim značajem društvenog umrežavanja u 
periodu produžene slabosti institucionalnog okruženja. Da bismo proverili našu opštu hipotezu 
opisaćemo među- i unutar-generacijske obrasce pokretljivosti. Značaj obrazovanja, pripadnosti 
političkim strankama i umrežavanja kao kanala pokretljivosti analiziramo putem modela logističke 
regresije. Takođe, poredimo promene u regrutacijskim obrascima elite sa promenama u obrascima 
pokretljivosti društvenih klasa u Srbiji, u periodu 1989-2004.  
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ABSTRACT In this paper the changing patterns of economic and political elite recruitment in Serbia 
are studied on the basis of three sets of data, collected in our surveys done in 1989, 1993 and 2004. 
Our hypothesis was that elite recruitment patterns changed after the political regime change in 2000, 
but in a different direction compared to the period of the 1990s. From a long-term perspective, we 
expect continuing increases in the relevance of higher education for elite recruitment, and equalization 
of the relevance of higher education for both the political and economic elites. On the other hand, we 
expect decreasing relevance for political affiliation among the economic elite, accompanied by an 
increasing importance of social networking during the period of a prolonged weak institutional 
environment. In order to test our general hypothesis we describe inter- and intra-generational patterns 
of recruitment. The relevance of education, party membership and networking as mobility channels is 
analyzed by model of logistic regression. We also compare changes in patterns of elites’ recruitment 
with changing mobility patterns of social classes in Serbia, 1989-2004. 
KEY WORDS Serbia, political elite, economic elite, recruitment patterns 
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Introduction 
By the elites we understand social groups who possess concentrated control 
over accumulated resources that are necessary for reproducing of the basic 
conditions upon which a given (or potential) social mode of production rests, and 
who play an active role in reproducing these conditions (cf. Lazić, in Higley, ed. 
2000). Such a control in socialism was in the hands of nomenklatura (or class of 
collective owners), the ruling group that was strictly hierarchically organized. Two 
other characteristics of the group also determined the patterns of its reproduction. 
First, an individual could keep a position inside nomenklatura (and enjoy all 
privileges that went with the position) as long as he/she actively performed a definite 
command role in the society. Second, individuals who occupied hierarchically 
higher positions inside nomenklatura (and who, by definition, were members of 
collective bodies – “committees”) had the exclusive right to appoint members at 
lower positions. These two characteristics secured nomenklatura to be an open social 
group: individuals as a rule were entering it from lower social positions, moved up 
step by step, could not hold positions by the end of their lives, and could not transfer 
their positions inter-generationally (see on these and other characteristics of the class 
of collective owners in Lazić, 1987). 
In former (socialist) Yugoslavia the first generation of nomenklatura members 
came to power after the Second World War and was recruited mainly from lower 
social strata (these were peasants and workers, who participated in partisan guerilla 
movement and acquired leading military or/and political positions after becoming 
members of the Communist Party). During the first two decades of socialist system, 
nomenklatura in Yugoslavia (and Serbia) kept itself wide open, so that it recruited 
individuals from all social strata proportionally. Egalitarian socialist legitimization 
was also one of the principal reasons for such openness. However, increasing 
hierarchical differentiation, together with increasing social complexity, started in 
time to narrow the recruitment basis of the ruling group: chances for inter- and intra-
generational advancement of individuals with peasant origin, firstly, and with 
manual workers origin, secondly, started to drop, while the importance of middle 
class origin started to get importance. In a survey made during the mid 1980s, the 
systemic obstacles were discovered for people of lower social origin (peasants and 
workers) to get to nomenklatura positions, while these positions were wide open to 
professionals (inter- and intra-generationally). At the same time, descendants of 
nomenklatura members were falling to professional positions (mostly) and to routine 
non-manual jobs (but very seldom to manual jobs). It should be kept in mind, 
however, that decreasing chances of lower strata did not mean complete closure of 
the upper group: legitimization needs still made possible for individuals of manual 
workers’ origin to climb to higher positions. Also, recruitment patterns of political 
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was becoming the necessary precondition for individuals to become managers in 
socialist enterprises, while the communist party membership came to the second 
place; the political party criterion, on the other hand, kept the priority for politicians 
(see results of survey of class of collective owners in Croatia/Yugoslavia, in Lazić, 
1987). 
The process of (partial!) closure of nomenklatura continued until the end of 
the 1980s, and empirical results of the closure will be presented soon. What should 
now be briefly be discussed is the specific process of post-socialist transformation in 
Serbia, which led to important changes in the patterns of elites’ recruitment. 
Namely, post-socialist transformation here took a path that significantly differed 
from “successful cases” of transition during the 1990s (for example, in Slovenia, 
Hungary or Poland). Former nomenklatura members in Serbia, led by Slobodan 
Milosevic, succeeded in blocking transformation long enough to convert their 
previous monopolistic social position into private capital. The consequence of this 
process of conversion was an extremely high rate of entrance of their members into 
the new economic elite of the country during the early 1990s (cf. Lazić, in Lazić ed. 
1995). At the same time, continued political domination of  the same group 
prevented massive entrance of new members into the political elite in Serbia, even 
after the democratic political system was formally introduced in 1990.  
The process of blocked post-socialist economic transformation in Serbia (in 
the form of extremely delayed privatization of state property) was, however, 
complemented by the legalization of market economy (on the concept of blocked 
transformation, see Lazić, in Lazić ed. 2000). It gradually made space for increased 
accumulation of private capital “from below”, by a new social stratum, recruited 
mainly from the groups of professionals and small entrepreneurs. (by the end..) 
Privatization “from above” (via capital conversion by former nomenklatura 
members) and “from below” (via gradual capital accumulation by individuals 
coming from middle class positions) created conditions by the end of the 1990s in 
which the continued political domination by regime of Slobodan Milosevic started 
to contradict interests of the new economic elite. Withdrawal of this elite’s support 
of the regime, increasing dissatisfaction among the population in Serbia that was 
massively pauperized, the consolidation of opposition parties, and Western help, 
finally led to the regime change in 2000. In this way conditions were created for 
significant change in the recruitment patterns of political elite (while modifications 
of recruitment patterns of economic elite might be expected to be much more 
gradual). 
Let us now summarize our position in the form of several hypotheses, which 
will be tested by the data we collected. Blocked post-socialist transformation in 
Serbia had the following consequences concerning patterns of elites’ recruitment. In 
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the economic and political elites were relatively open groups into which members of 
all social strata were recruited. In time, however, relative chances for elite 
recruitment of professionals and lower managers started to increase, while the 
chances of manual workers and especially peasants were decreasing. Intra-
generational mobility was much more affected by the closure than inter-generational 
mobility. During the period of 1989-2004, recruitment patterns of the elites started 
more profoundly to change, but following different trajectories for political and 
economic elites. Since former nomenklatura members continued to keep political 
power until 2000, social origin of political elite (as well as of the managerial part of 
economic elite, who kept positions inside state firms) did not change by this time 
since socialist period. However, recruitment patterns of entrepreneurial portion of 
economic elite did change, since – intra-generationally – former nomenklatura 
members were recruited to this group in high numbers. 
Following the change of political regime in 2000, we expect to find new shifts 
in elites’ recruitment patterns in Serbia. Apparently this change profoundly altered 
the composition of political elite, bringing into it individuals with different social 
origin (inter- and intra-generationally). On the other hand, concerning economic 
elite, the process of conversion of political positions of former nomenklatura 
members into economic capital was already completed. At the same time, 
privatization of state property has started to accelerate, and rules of market economy 
have strengthened. Therefore, our hypothesis is that change of elites’ recruitment 
patterns took different direction after 2000, if compared to the period of 1990s. This 
time, we expect to find much more change in recruitment of political elite, 
accompanied with certain closure in upward mobility, since social origin (intra- and 
inter-generational) of the elite has become much higher in comparison with socialist 
period (or with period of blocked transformation). On the other hand, we expect to 
find milder changes in recruitment of economic elite, due to slow pace of structural 
change, accompanied with more openness as well, since increased number of small 
entrepreneurs and professionals has got a chance to enter economic elite positions. 
We also expect to find continuing increase in the relevance of higher education for 
elites’ recruitment, and equalization of the relevance of higher education for both 
political and economic elites. Furthermore, we expect decreasing relevance of 
political affiliation among economic elite, accompanied by increasing importance of 
social networking during the period of prolonged weak institutional environment.  
The changing patterns of elites recruitment in Serbia will be studied on the 
basis of three sets of data, collected in our surveys done in 1989, 1993 and 2004. In 
1989 survey, 219 members of political elite and 231 members of economic elite 
were interviewed. The patterns of recruitment observed in this survey will be 
compared with data on 69 members of political elite and 256 members of economic 
elite, collected in our 1993 survey. Finally, these surveys will be compared with data Mladen Lazić, Slobodan Cvejić: Changes in the Recruitment Patterns…   101 
 
collected in our 2004 survey of 205 members of economic elite and 206 members of 
political elite. In order to test our general hypotheses we will describe inter- and 
intra-generational patterns of recruitment. The relevance of education, party 
membership and networking as mobility channels will be analyzed through the 
model of logistic regression in which the log of the probability of belonging to 
political vs. economic elites will be the dependent variable and ruling party 
(coalition) membership, level of education, social network density, year of survey 
and some of interactions will be the covariates. We will also compare changes in 
patterns of elites’ recruitment with changing mobility patterns of social classes in 
Serbia, in the period of 1989-2004. Data on class mobility will be taken from two 
surveys: the Change in the class structure and mobility in Serbia, done on 3660 
respondents in 1989; and the South-East European Social Survey Project (SEESSP), 
done on 2997 respondents in December 2003/January 2004. 
Intra-Generational Mobility of Elites in Serbia 
As we mentioned in the introductory part of the paper, recruitment patterns of 
elites in early (Yugoslav/Serbian) socialism depended on several factors: 
revolutionary change of the previous system, which brought to the top positions 
almost completely “new people”, as a rule from lower social strata; belated 
modernization in Serbia, the consequence of which was a very small number of 
highly educated people in the country after the revolution, and orientation of the 
ruling class (nomenklatura) toward rapid expansion of educational system 
(especially of university education); egalitarian communist ideology, which 
demanded people from manual working class to be directly recruited into the ruling 
class; collectivist character of the dominant class relations, which made possibility 
of inter-generational “inheritance” of ruling class positions to represent an 
exception. As socialist system “maturated”, and as middle class expanded 
(especially professional and lower managerial strata), process of “closure” of elite 
recruitment was getting momentum. The closure meant that elites’ recruitment basis 
was progressively reduced to middle strata (professionals and lower managers). 
Nevertheless, limited chances for members of lower strata (mostly office and 
manual workers) to enter directly top social positions were kept on. 
The end of socialism in Serbia was also marked by a paradoxical historical 
development: former ruling group kept dominant political and economic positions 
even after political pluralism was introduced in the country. Such course of events 
led to continuity in the elite recruitment process more than into a new discontinuity, 
during the first period of blocked transformation. The heritage of this period, during 
which many former nomenklatura members converted their position power into 
economic capital, could be registered even today, if we look into intra-generational 102   SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. XLVIII (2006), N° 2  
 
and inter-generational mobility of the elites. Now let us start our empirical analysis 
with survey data on intra-generational mobility. 
 
Table 1. Intra-generational inflow to elite positions, 1989, 1993, 2004, in % 
Respondent’s position at first job 
Year  Respondent’s present 
position  Higher 
class* 
Middle 
class 
Transitory 
stratum 
Manual 
workers  Peasants 
Economic elite  3  80  12  5  / 
Political elite  9  63  18  10  /  1989 
Overall 6  72  15  7  / 
Economic elite  5  71  14  10  / 
Political elite  6  84  9  1  /  1993 
Overall 5  74  13  8  / 
Economic elite  10  79  8  3  / 
Political elite  12  80  6  2  /  2004 
Overall 11  79  7  3  / 
*Classes: Manual workers: un-skilled, semi-skilled, skilled; Transitory stratum: office workers 
and technicians with secondary school, self-employed with secondary education (or less); Middle: 
professionals, lower managers, self-employed with tertiary education, small entrepreneurs; Higher: 
managers, medium and big entrepreneurs, politicians 
 
We start our data analysis with change in recruitment patterns of the economic 
elite. It may be seen from the Table 1 that there were no basic changes in economic 
elite recruitment during the period of blocked transformation (1989-1993), since 
former nomenklatura cadres mostly kept their positions. We have to have in mind 
here that privatization process at that time had just started in Serbia, so that members 
of the economic elite were still primarily managers in public enterprises. The real 
difference in recruitment patterns, however, was visible even at that time among 
new and relatively small sub-stratum of elite entrepreneurs (78 cases in our sample), 
where we found extreme predominance of former nomenklatura people, or members 
of their families. Namely, some two thirds of these entrepreneurs were coming 
directly or indirectly (via family or  network of friends) to their positions using 
different instruments of capital conversion (privileged status in an enterprise during 
its privatization, or position inside state apparatuses which made possible 
involvement in illegal trade during the international sanctions, etc.).
2 
Rising differences in recruitment patterns of the economic elite as a whole are 
visible in our 2004 data. It may be seen that individuals whose positions at the 
beginning of their carriers were below the middle class level, could only 
exceptionally count on achieving elite status in Serbian economy (their chances are 
much smaller now, in comparison with socialist period). Middle class position – 
either professional, or lower managerial, or small-entrepreneurial – has become a 
                                                 
2 See more detailed survey data on results of this process of capital conversion in Lazić ed. 1995. Mladen Lazić, Slobodan Cvejić: Changes in the Recruitment Patterns…   103 
 
prerequisite for entering the elite circle. Also, number of people who directly entered 
economic elite at the very beginning of their carriers has been significantly 
increased. Here we probably witness the rise of principle of family inheritance of 
class position (via private property), a clear sign of the new system of reproduction 
of social relations. 
Another difference in patterns of economic elite recruitment in the two 
periods (socialist/blocked transformation, and present) may be seen in the case of 
positions that preceded present elite status. Namely, in late socialism these were 
almost exclusively professional or lower managerial positions
3. Members of 
economic elite today, however, most often declare their previous position to be also 
the elite one! In order to understand better these findings, let us look into another set 
of data, on positions the elite members occupied in 1990, at the end of socialist 
order. 
 
Table 2. Positions occupied in 1990 by members of present economic elite, in % 
Positions* 
Manual workers  Transitory stratum  Middle Class  Higher Class 
0.5 2.9  30.2  66.3 
*See table 1 
 
Looking at table 2, we may see much more clearly the personal “continuity” 
in the composition of the economic elite in Serbia, as a consequence of blocked 
transformation. Since only a handful of entrepreneurs could claim at the time to 
belong to economic elite (privatization had just started), it is clear that socialist 
managers were either keeping their positions for fifteen years, in enterprises which 
only changed their property labels, from self-managerial to state, or – together with 
politicians – were acquiring large private property during the process of prolonged 
market transformation of Serbian economy.
4  
If we look now into all of our data on economic elite’s intra-generational 
mobility, we may conclude that large majority of members of the elite started their 
carriers at professional positions during socialism, and moved to managerial or 
political positions before the systemic change. They were successful in keeping 
managerial positions even after 1990, or they were even more successful in 
                                                 
3 In socialism it was not very usual for a politician to move to managerial position, e.g., since this 
would in most cases represent downward mobility, which itself was an exception. See data and 
interpretation in Lazić, 1987. 
4 Success in capital conversion has had consequences for age structure of the economic elite in Serbia. 
Namely, almost three quarters (72.7%) of elite members in our 2004 sample are over 50 years of 
age, while the rest are between 31 and 50 years of age. Only 31.2% of economic elite members 
belonged to the oldest category in 1993! This “ageing” of the economic elite is another sign of 
systemic change: there are no age (retirement) limits for private owners to run their firms. 104   SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. XLVIII (2006), N° 2  
 
converting their position power into large private capital. Only a third of present 
members of the economic elite came to positions after the transformation started in 
Serbia, and almost all of them moved upward from middle class positions: from 
professional or lower managerial positions to higher managerial positions inside 
public enterprises, or from professional or small entrepreneurial positions into 
medium or big entrepreneurial positions. For members of lower social strata, intra-
generation entrance into the economic elite in Serbia has been almost completely 
closed after 1990. 
Moving now to our data on political elite, we may notice that it has also 
become increasingly closed for members of lower social strata. In late socialism, 
more than a quarter of politicians started their carriers as manual or routine office 
workers and was able to climb up the social hierarchy, while this chance was 
progressively dropping during the 1990s. Instead, middle class, mostly professional 
positions have started to represent much more important recruitment basis for 
politicians. The “professionalization” of political elite has started to be particularly 
visible in public after the change of regime in 2000, since intellectuals (university 
professors, writers, scientists) were playing the dominant role among leaders of 
former opposition parties. Furthermore, the introduction of multiparty system 
obviously attracted many newcomers to political life, so that up to 2004 slight 
increase of people who started their carriers at political positions might also be 
noticed (lower elite positions inside new party apparatuses, or in parliaments – 
federal, republican or regional – were often given to young people).  
Naturally, it may be expected that change in recruitment patterns of the elites 
represents only a part of general change in mobility process in Serbian class 
structure. In order to confirm such a hypothesis, intra-generational inflow mobility 
rates for classes as defined in analysis of elites are presented in the following table, 
comparatively for the last period of socialism (1989) and nowadays (2004).  
First of all, it can be noticed that all values but one at the major diagonal 
increased from 1989 to 2004, which meant that an already low career mobility in 
Serbia decreased even further. This is most evident with transitory stratum, where 
inflow from the same position increased from 57% to 72%, mostly due to weakening 
of career shift from manual to non-manual work. Demand for administrative work 
that had been increasing during the process of rapid industrialization and growth of 
state apparatuses in the first couple of decades of socialism stabilized later on, and 
“rewards” (wages and attractiveness) of skilled non-manual positions have declined. 
With changes in society and economy mentioned above, university education has 
become prerequisite for good structural positioning (Cvejić, 2006). However, it 
became much harder to attain it during the career in the 1990s, especially because of 
dramatic drop in living standards in these years. Such clear educational demarcation 
of elite-middle class mobility pattern, produced by structural and economic change, Mladen Lazić, Slobodan Cvejić: Changes in the Recruitment Patterns…   105 
 
has been followed by yet another push at the lower part of social hierarchy, one that 
was marked by the only decreasing rate at the major diagonal of the table 3. Higher 
inflow of manual workers to small farmer positions can be noticed, which means 
that structural closure at the top of the scale and bankruptcy of many state-owned 
enterprises has been joined by forced crystallization of labor market position at the 
bottom. Namely, many of those who were holding two positions during socialism (in 
socialist enterprise and at family farm) unwillingly chose farming as survival 
strategy “at hand”. This has been followed also by a decrease in inflow of peasants 
to manual worker positions. 
 
Table 3
5. Intra-generational inflow mobility rates, 1989-2004, in % 
Respondent’s position at first job 
Year  Respondent’s present 
position  Higher 
class 
Middle 
class 
Transitory 
stratum 
Manual 
workers  Peasants 
Economic elite  3  73 19  6   
Political elite  9  63 18 10   
Middle class    61  23 15 1 
Transitory stratum    2  57  39 2 
Manual workers    1  1  93  5 
Peasants     1  8  91 
1989 
Overall 1  20  15  42  23 
Economic elite  8  72 15  4   
Political elite  12  80 6  2   
Middle class    64  24 12   
Transitory stratum    2  72  23 3 
Manual workers      4  94  1 
Peasants     1  15  84 
2004 
Overall 2  24  23  35  6 
 
The tendencies of career formation mentioned above point to the fact that elite 
recruitment in Serbia today has been unfolding under ambivalent circumstances. On 
the one hand, we can recognize the increasing “professionalization” of the elites, by 
their more frequent career start in the middle class, but on the other hand, we can see 
that intra-generational education expansion is happening too slowly, which narrows 
recruitment reservoir of the elites, and probably contributes to elite closure. In 
general this is related to the state of economy where needs for higher education and 
larger size of middle class are stagnating. 
                                                 
5 Note that the rates for economic and political elites in Table 3 slightly differ from Table 1. This is due 
to enlargement of the two (mostly of the economic elite) in the national sample, by adding several 
cases that originally do not hold an elite position. In our analysis of national sample the dominance 
principle was applied, which meant that married respondent got higher of the two class positions in 
the marriage. This approach increases mobility rates in general. This way 2/3 of elite members in 
the national sample came to this position through marriage, and not by their actual job. 
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Inter-Generational Mobility of Elites 
Let us move now to our data on inter-generational mobility and check if the 
change of elite recruitment patterns, registered so far, could be found in this field 
too. 
 
Table 4. Inter-generational inflow to elite positions, 1989, 1993, 2004, in % 
Father’s position 
Year  Respondent’s present 
position  Higher 
class 
Middle 
class 
Transitory 
stratum 
Manual 
workers  Peasants 
Economic elite  3  25  14  28  30 
Political elite  2  21  14  32  31  1989 
Overall 3  23  14  30  30 
Economic elite  6  17  17  25  35 
Political elite  12  23  15  8  42  1993 
Overall 6  19  17  21  37 
Economic elite  24  37  8  19  12 
Political elite  28  37  13  15  7  2004 
Overall 26  37  10  17  10 
 
It  is obvious, again, that many similarities between inter-generational 
recruitment patterns of the economic elite in socialist time, and during blocked post-
socialist transformation, may be noticed, while significant change has occurred after 
the transformation was un-blocked. Relatively open character of socialist 
recruitment patterns is visible in proportions of lower-class fathers among the 
economic elite members, which roughly corresponds to distribution of strata in 
general population of Serbia (long after the World War II Serbia was predominantly 
agricultural country). In 1993 the only change deserving comment is the increase in 
percentage of fathers who belonged to higher class.
6 The change is consistent with 
our previous conclusion about the role of family class position in capital conversion: 
fathers who were nomenklatura members made possible for their offspring
7 to 
acquire entrepreneurial status and in this way “inherit” a higher class position. This 
is how we may explain actions of nomenklatura members during the system changes 
in the 1990s. Namely, to achieve their long-term interests, they made the following 
                                                 
6 Increase in percentage of peasant fathers is probably result of sampling procedure, which included 
many firms in provincial cities in Serbia. For possible additional explanation see also below, fn. 7. 
Increased number of fathers who belonged to transitory stratum (and corresponding decrease of 
middle class fathers) comes mostly from the problem of definition: we had to include into 
transitory stratum all "self-employed“ persons (since we had not enough data on fathers; they make 
more than 5% of the total), while many of them certainly belonged to middle class. 
7 These were mostly sons! – since only 10% of economic elite members in 1993 were women; the 
percentage of women among economic elite “jumped” to 17.4 in 2004.  
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three steps in the process of system transformation: first, they did not oppose initial 
systemic change in 1989/90, so that market economy and private property were 
finally legitimized and inter-generational transfer of upper social positions was made 
possible; secondly, they blocked the deepening of the change in period 1991/97, in 
order to convert their position power into private wealth; and thirdly, they helped the 
transformation to unblock after 1997, and especially after 2000, to use their new 
property without external limits, in the system of market economy. 
Unblocking the transformation has produced significant consequences for 
inter-generational mobility of the economic elite. We may notice a strong tendency 
towards closure of the upper social strata in 2004. Number of people with peasant 
origin who could move upwards has been very much reduced (this drop has been 
much faster than the decline in proportion of peasants in Serbian society, which at 
present comes to about 15%). Furthermore, drop of manual workers’ offspring 
among the elite members is also noticeable. On the other hand, increase in number 
of economic elite members coming from middle class families has been very rapid. 
And especially important has been the dramatic increase of higher class’ offspring 
who succeeded in “inheriting” top class positions in Serbian society! Only now it is 
possible to understand fully the real consequences of blocked transformation for the 
process named “elite reconstruction” (cf. Lazić, in Higley & Lengyel, eds. 2000). 
Namely, former nomenklatura members succeeded not only to secure their own 
dominant positions in society (by capital conversion), they also made possible for 
their sons (and not very often for their daughters) to directly inherit elite positions, 
something that only exceptionally could have happened in socialism. This family 
transfer of positions, obviously, has had two forms (which have been more and more 
manifested as consecutive phases): conversion of position power into private capital, 
and legal inheritance of private capital (our inter-generational data lump these two 
cases together). 
If we move now to recruitment patterns of political elite, we may see that this 
part of elite, as well, has been transformed from a relatively open to a relatively 
closed (in a selective way) group. While in 1989 distribution of fathers roughly 
corresponds to proportion of classes in Serbian population (middle class in time was 
increasing, as mentioned before), in 1993 strong increase of higher class offspring 
inside the elite may be noticed. Instead of being an obstacle, fathers’ political or 
managerial position became the resource that made possible for someone to get to a 
political position. The change had to do both with transformation of legitimization
8 
                                                 
8 The legitimization change probably may help to explain otherwise strange increase in number of 
peasant fathers and drop of manual worker fathers among politicians in 1993. Namely, because of 
the tendency to eliminate socialist ideology that glorified workers, and of parallel rise of 
nationalism with its stress on „organic“ (peasant) roots of nation, it might be that politicians 
„reinterpreted“ correspondingly their social origin (the rapid industrialization in Serbia after 1945 108   SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. XLVIII (2006), N° 2  
 
and of type of organization of political system: political pluralism does not (like 
nomenklatura hierarchy does) prohibit, by itself, political careers more than business 
careers of individuals who are offspring of people at power. In fact, during the early 
years of (blocked) transformation in Serbia, when old rules were dismantled and 
new rules did not even start to form, accumulated resources (economic, political, 
social etc.) represented almost the only tool for social promotion, unrestricted by any 
subtle mechanism (like public opinion, internalized ethic norms, etc.). 
 
Table 5. Inter-generational inflow mobility, 1989-2004, in % 
Father’s position 
Year  Respondent’s present 
position  Higher 
class 
Middle 
class 
Transitory 
stratum 
Manual 
workers  Peasants 
Economic elite  3  24 16  28  28 
Political elite  2  21 14  32  31 
Middle class  3  27  16 26  28 
Transitory stratum  2  12  13  42 31 
Manual workers    6  5  43  46 
Peasants   2  1  7  90 
1989 
Overall 1  12  8  30  49 
Economic elite  20  30 11  25  14 
Political elite  28  37 13  15 7 
Middle class  9  24  19 31  17 
Transitory stratum  4  10  24  41 21 
Manual workers  1  2  7  57  33 
Peasants     4  15  81 
2004 
Overall 7  13  13  40  27 
 
Our next set of data, collected in 2004, after the second (and relatively free!) 
parliamentary elections since the removal of S. Milosevics’ regime were 
successfully completed, demonstrated the continuation of the closure of political 
elite. Almost two thirds of present members of the elite declared that their fathers 
belong(ed) to middle or upper social class! What seems a little strange here is high 
percentage of upper-class fathers (managers, entrepreneurs, politicians). Since such 
tendency – of massive recruitment of political elite from former (or present) elite 
circles – has not been registered in public life (and since it cannot happen 
unnoticed), we may offer again (like in fn. 7) socio-psychological explanation as the 
most acceptable one: our respondents probably tended to over-estimate positions of 
their fathers (“promoting” middle class people – like lower managers, small 
entrepreneurs, professionals in state administration etc. – into upper class members: 
higher managers, big entrepreneurs, politicians). If this is the case, once again we 
may register the significant change in legitimization pattern that has been developing 
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in contrast to former socialist ideology: instead of glorifying working class origin, it 
is becoming helpful for political career to stress someone’s higher social 
background.
9 
Let us continue our discussion now with brief comparison of inter-
generational recruitment of the elites with inflow mobility of other classes. Here as 
well, the dominance approach in definition of class position of the national sample 
respondents was applied (see above, fn. 4). 
The increase of self-reproduction of the elites between 1989 and 2004 is the 
major trend in an overall process of inter-generational social closure. Furthermore, 
another process registered in our findings that has deep structural effects, is the 
strengthening of elite-middle class recruitment pattern. The pattern that was 
dominant in analysis of intra-generational mobility was also apparent inter-
generationally. Half of economic elite and almost 2/3 of political elite was recruited 
through this axis that encountered some 20% of population. A more even 
distribution of social origin for members of middle class defuses the tension inside 
the social structure only mildly. Here the influence of elite-middle class 
reproduction axis is increased only slightly and the major change is drop of 
percentage of peasant fathers (not significantly above its drop in overall population, 
though). However, it should be stressed that recruitment into middle class from 
lower positions is not equivalent to increase of these groups in population, i.e. 
relative mobility rates point to high self-reproduction of middle class, too. In 
comparison with analysis of intra-generational mobility, transitory stratum was 
“spared” from drop of manual workers fill-in but this inflow did not increase either, 
although it could have been expected due to increase in workers rate in population. 
On the other hand, transitory stratum origin in middle class did not increase, while 
the stratum grew, having risen, as a consequence, self-reproduction rate in clerks and 
technicians strata. 
Changes in Mobility Paths of the Elites 
So far several factors were mentioned that influenced changes in recruitment 
of economic and political elites in Serbia from 1989 to 2004, like changes in social 
role and organizational structure of the elites, changes in legitimation principles, 
expansion of education, inter-connectedness among elite members, etc. Most of 
evidence was given for changes in major mobilization basis and that was class 
origin, and some comparison in this respect was made between elites and other 
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social classes. At this point we would like to go to another direction and somehow 
make synthetic analysis of the paths of elite formation. We will not compare elites 
and other classes in this respect, but rather compare the two elite groups, economic 
and political elite, in order to see how different factors influenced their formation. 
For this purpose, a model of logistic regression will be used in which categories of 
dependent variable will be political vs. economic elite position, and covariates will 
represent some of the elites’ mobility factors mentioned earlier. Importance of 
political legitimation will be recognized through membership in ruling political 
party(ies): Communist League in 1989; Socialist Party of Serbia in 1993; and 
Democratic Party of Serbia, G17+, Serbian Renewal Movement, New Serbia or 
Socialist Party of Serbia in 2004. This membership will be presented by indicator 
variable. Education will be presented by 4-level ordinal variable (primary to 
university education). Unfortunately, we do not have appropriate data for 
comparative analysis of elites’ social networks, but we will try to catch some of it by 
introducing class position of respondent’s best friend, presented through indicator 
variable (1 – elite, 0 – other). Father’s class position will be operationalized by 
dummy, too, higher and middle classes marked by 1, other by 0. Finally, to make the 
analysis dynamic, we will actually build the same model in three successive points 
of time, when our surveys were done. The model (M1) has the following form: 
log Пi/ Пj = Y = β0 + β1 X1 + β2 X2 + β3 X3 + β4 X4      (1) 
where: 
Y – dependent dichotomous variable, economic elite being referent category 
β0 – constant 
X1 – education, ordinal, 4 levels (primary to higher) 
X2  – ruling political party membership, dummy, not being a member as 
referent category 
X3 – best friend's class position, dummy, other but elite positions as referent 
category 
X4  – father's class position, dummy, lower than middle class as referent 
category 
β1 – parameter for education, 
β2 – parameter for ruling political party membership, 
β3 – parameter for best friend's class position, 
β4 – parameter for father's class position 
The results for three models are presented in the table 6. 
A single sample bias in 1993 survey produces two unexpected effects in the 
former table, namely the increase of relevance of education for political elite as 
compared to economic elite and increase of relevance of higher/middle class origin 
of the same group. This bias came from the fact that sub-sample of political elite in 
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economy. Comparison of this group with the managers of private enterprises who 
did not have university education, and who represented 9% of 1993 economic elite 
sub-sample, produced contrast expressed by exp(B) of 7.009 in 1993. This bias put 
aside, we could conclude that, after the period of difference in higher education rate 
among political and economic elite during socialism (exp(B)  .503), which was 
explained earlier in the paper, educational balance was actually reached earlier than 
2004, when it was noticed in our survey. The same bias put aside, we could also 
conclude that there was no significant difference in class origin between economic 
and political elite during period of 1989-2004. 
 
Table 6. Results for model M1 in 3 surveys 
YEAR OF SURVEY 
1989 1993 2004  COVARIATES 
Signif.  exp(B)  Signif.  exp(B) Signif. exp(B) 
Education .001  .503  .000 7.009 .989  .997 
Ruling party membership  .000 9.039 .000 4.702 .000 8.015 
Best friend’s class position  .421 .801 .009 .528 .018 .582 
Father’s class position  .543  .854  .001 2.336 .377 1.229 
Constant  .413  2.020  .000 .000 .761 .760 
 
Higher relevance of political affiliation for political elite represents another 
constant throughout the researched period, besides equality in importance of 
higher/middle class origin for membership in the two elites. On the other hand, 
economic elite was in favour of elite friendships: after the break of socialism, 
statistically significant advantage over political elite in this regard has been 
maintained over time. It seems that now when the two elite groups have same profile 
regarding education and social origin, the major difference in their reproduction is in 
control over different resources, systemic vs. economic, and in permanence of their 
position, which inevitably turns them one to another. How much this cooperation 
will be beneficial to wider community will depend on further institutional 
arrangements through which relation between elites will be channeled. 
 
* * * 
 
Putting all our previous findings together, it might be concluded that, for an 
individual in Serbia, his/her middle class or higher class origin, and/or an elite 
position (in socialist or post-socialist system), have a significantly increased 
probability to come to an elite position during the process of post-socialist 
transformation. The probability has been high here, even if compared with other 112   SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. XLVIII (2006), N° 2  
 
countries during the first phase of their transformation (Cvejić, 2005).
10 This has 
been a relatively lasting consequence of blocked transformation in Serbia, which has 
been continuing to make Serbian transformation a specific case.  
We should stress that the closure of economic and political elites in Serbia (by 
“lifting” their inter- and intra-generational origin to middle and higher classes) 
corresponds to increasing differences in economic positions of these two parts of 
stratification hierarchy in Serbia. Namely, according to our data on economic 
positions of classes, collected in the same survey in 2004, differentiation between 
higher class (in particular) and the middle class, on one side, and other social 
classes, on the other side, has been significantly increased since 1997 (see Lazić and 
Cvejić, 2004). 
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